Ask someone what a classical liberal believes, and you'll get a familiar list. Classical liberals stand for private property. They stand for free markets and limited government. They believe in the rule of law, free trade, free speech, and religious toleration. Give or take an item or two, you'll find something like this list in any textbook summary, or on the "about" page of most classical liberal think tanks. And it's a good list, as far as it goes. Each of those commitments has a long history in the tradition, and each has been defended by some of its best minds.

My goal in this essay is to argue that democracy belongs on the list, and that it belongs there for the same reason the other items do: because it is a way of keeping power in check. Democracy's distinctive function is to keep power contestable, so that the people who hold it can be removed without violence.

I agree in part, but also differ on some key points. Libertarians should generally prefer democracy to other forms of government. But democracy should not be a first-order libertarian priority. And recent events make  libertarian critiques of democracy even more important and timely than in the past. There is also a question of comparative advantage. Most libertarian scholars and policy analysts are better-positioned to do the work of explaining why democracy needs to be constrained than to extol its virtues relative to authoritarianism. Others can do the latter task as well or better than we can.

To avoid terminological confusion, I should note that I prefer to use "libertarian," whereas Zwolinski uses "classical liberal" to denote essentially the same ideology. But nothing of significance hinges on this terminological difference. Elsewhere, I have argued that there is no meaningful distinction between "libertarian" and "classical liberal"; I prefer the former for largely esthetic reasons. But I have no beef with people who prefer "classical liberal." My reservations about Zwolinski's position lie elsewhere.

Why Democracy is (Generally) Better than Authoritarianism

First, some points of agreement. Overwhelming empirical evidence shows that people living under democratic governments are generally freer and more affluent than those under authoritarian rule. In addition, Zwolinski is right that democracy is in some ways a valuable check on power. In particular, democracy deters political leaders from harming the majority of the population in large and obvious ways. To take just one dramatic example, economist Amartya Sen famously found that mass famines never or almost never occur in democracies, while they are all too common under dictatorship. Even ignorant voters will notice a famine is going on, blame incumbent politicians for it, and punish them at the ballot box for it. The same goes for other large and obvious disasters.

Few libertarians deny these points. I myself have said as much in many of my works critical of democracy, such as my book Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government is Smarter. But it is arguable we should stress them more often.

Democracy as a Secondary, Instrumental Value

At the same time, it doesn't follow that democracy should be a first-order libertarian priority, on par with liberty, constraining coercion, property rights, and increasing human happiness. Once you recognize (as most libertarians, and many other liberals do) that democratic government is not genuinely consensual, and that democratically enacted policies are not exempt from moral censure, it becomes hard to argue that democracy is inherently valuable. Rather, democracy is an institutional tool that can - if properly constrained - help achieve genuinely fundamental values. In that respect, it is similar to such institutions as federalism, separation of powers, and judicial review. All of these can have great instrumental value. But none are valuable in and of themselves. If a unitary state with no separation of powers and no judicial review could promote liberty and happiness better than available alternatives, libertarians should support it. The same goes for a hypothetical non-democratic state that could do the same.

Zwolinski criticizes F.A. Hayek for saying in a 1981 interview that he would "prefer a liberal dictator to a democratic government lacking liberalism." To the extent that Zwolinski merely means that a dictatorship is highly unlikely to actually be liberal, he's right. But Hayek did not claim that such a liberal dictatorship is likely. Much the contrary, as Zwolinski notes elsewhere in his essay, Hayek recognized that liberal values are generally better served by democracy than authoritarianism, even writing that "the consistent application of liberal principles… leads to democracy."

Yet in a hypothetical situation where a dictatorship is genuinely more liberal than any feasible democratic alternative, the former is genuinely a lesser evil than the latter. There are virtually no historical examples of dictatorships that fully protect liberal values, even to the extent that relatively well-functioning real-world liberal democracies do. But there are exceptional but genuine situations where non-democratic government can be less illiberal than democracy would be in the same situation.

Notable examples are the allied occupations of Germany and Japan after World War II. In both cases, the allies imposed non-democratic occupation governments which ruled these countries for several years. Given the deeply illiberal state of German and Japanese public opinion at the time, an immediate transition to democracy might have well have brought some sort of fascist regime back to power. Even after democracy was established, the new governments restricted the range of political parties allowed to compete in elections. West Germany, for example, for many years banned both Nazis and communists from holding elected office.

I won't go into detail. But similar measures may be necessary to effect a transition to liberal democracy in some of today's deeply illiberal states, such as Russia and China. Hayek wasn't entirely wrong to think that "a dictatorship may be a necessary system during a transitional period."

Zwolinski rightly warns that even a seemingly liberal dictatorship can turn oppressive. But, of course, the same is true of a democracy in which majority public opinion is deeply illiberal and there are few or no institutional constraints on government power. Which of these evils is the greater danger will vary with circumstances. In most cases, democracy is a lesser danger than despotism. But exceptions can and do arise.

The Continuing - and Growing - Relevance of Libertarian Critiques of Democracy

An electorate of well-informed, unbiased voters devoted to liberal values would never bring communists, fascists, or other dangerous illiberal movements to power. But, as outlined in my own recent contribution to Liberalism.Org (which Zwolinski generously references in his article), real-world voters are are often systematically ignorant, do a poor job of evaluating the information they do know, and sometimes have deeply illiberal values.

These shortcomings of democracy - voter ignorance and bias, "tyranny of the majority," and opportunities for illiberal movements to use the democratic process to come to power - are systematic weaknesses that libertarian scholars and analysts have done pioneering work on.  And, as explained in my Liberalism.Org article and other work, they are especially relevant in an age of resurgent authoritarian right-wing nationalism in Europe and the US. Where these movements have succeeded, it is in large part by exploiting voter ignorance and biases, and by using overgrown government to implement their oppressive agenda. Libertarians have long (rightly) warned that sweeping regulatory authority and emergency powers can be turned to illiberal purposes, and that voter ignorance heightens these dangers. Donald Trump and his counterparts in other countries have demonstrated the validity of these fears more vividly than any other developments for a long time.

Recent developments also bolster the value of libertarian solutions to democracy's flaws, which are primarily to limit and decentralize government power, rather than to rely on getting the "right" people in office. As James Madison famously warned, "[e]nlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm." Ignorant and biased electorates will often bring the unenlightened to power.

Government powers that cannot be entrusted to the unenlightened must be abolished or at least tightly constrained. And many powers cannot be wielded justly even in the hands of relatively decent leaders. Thus, I have argued that agencies like the FCC and ICE should be terminated, not merely "reformed." Trump has shown that authoritarian-minded leaders can use these types of agencies in horrible ways. But they perpetrate grave injustices even under more conventional presidents, in part because even then voters do a poor job of recognizing and monitoring their abuses.

Ironically, the resurgence of right-wing nationalist authoritarianism is one of the main factors leading Zwolinski and others to fear that libertarians should do more to praise democracy. But, in reality, this development accentuates the importance of our critiques of democracy's shortcomings. If not properly addressed, these weaknesses can give rise to horribly oppressive policies, and even destroy democracy itself.

Non-libertarian liberals should recognize that the libertarian critique of democracy has greater merit than many previously thought, even if they continue to differ with us on other points. For their part, libertarians should recognize that, in much of the world today, right-wing nationalists pose a greater threat to libertarian values and priorities than the political left does. Our critiques of democracy have as much relevance to these right-wing menaces as they do to left-wing ones, perhaps even more. This may require a difficult psychological reorientation for some. But it is necessary.

Finally, there is an issue of comparative advantage. Libertarians are a small minority with limited resources. Given these constraints, we should focus on those areas where we can make the biggest contributions to the struggle for freedom. In that context, we should recognize that libertarian scholars and policy analysts are particularly well-positioned to highlight shortcomings of democracy that need to be addressed more effectively, including voter ignorance and bias, tyranny of the majority, and others. Libertarian thinkers have already made major contributions to the study of these issues, and proposed useful solutions to them (I provide some overviews in my recent Liberalism.Org article, and here).

By contrast, most of the time, we have no comparative advantage when it comes to extolling the virtues of democracy relative to authoritarianism. Other types of liberals can do this work just as well as we can, perhaps better. Where necessary, we can and should remind people that we know democracy is generally better than authoritarianism. And we should further distance ourselves from those few  self-described libertarians who believe that authoritarianism is generally good (Zwolinski rightly excoriates Hans-Hermann Hoppe on this point)  But, most of the time, that should not be a major focus of our efforts.

In a predominantly libertarian society, it would make sense for some significant proportion of libertarians to devote all or most of their time to explaining why democracy is better than authoritarianism and making sure other libertarians don't take democracy-skepticism too far. But that is not the world we live in, and won't be anytime soon.

In the situation we actually find ourselves in, most libertarians can best help the cause of freedom by promoting and extending our critiques of democracy's weaknesses. This is not only the best way we can defend liberal values generally, but also the best way to protect democracy itself against its own tendency to empower authoritarian movements that might destroy it.